




Alternative Measures for Funding
Software Development
Center for Economic and Policy Research










The Inefficiency of Copyright and Patent Protection in the Software Industry
Deadweight Loss: Consumers Cannot Buy Software at the Cost of Production
IPR Protection -- Impeding Innovation and Promoting Duplication
Rent Seeking Activities of IPR Holders
21st Century Alternatives to Copyrights and Patents



















Dean  Baker is Co-Director of the Center for Economic and Policy Research.
John Schmitt provided helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.and marketing, and payments to lawyers and
lobbyists. Those enjoying IPR protection have
also been able to impose costs on third parties,
for example by requiring Internet Service
Providers to monitor activities or universities to
take steps to reduce the amount of unauthorized
copying of IPR protected material on their
premises. IPR holders have also secured laws that
restrict the development of software and
hardware designed to support better searches and
digital reproductions;
· There are feasible alternative mechanisms for
supporting software development. One
mechanism outlined in the paper would create a
“Software Development Corps,” which would
be a series of competing government funded
software corporations. An annual appropriation
of $2.1 billion (approximately 0.08 percent of
federal spending) should be enough to support
the work of approximately 20,000 software
developers. The government should be able to
recoup most, if not all, of this money through
the lower price it will pay on the computers and
software it purchases. The remaining benefit
would be the equivalent of a tax cut to consumers
in the range of $80 to $120 billion a year. This
money would provide a substantial stimulus to
the economy and lead to the creation of millions
of jobs.
A unique feature of this proposal for a Software
Development Corps is that it could exist side-by-side
with the existing copyright and patent system. Software
developers, such as Microsoft, could continue to produce
IPR-protected software and sell it in the market. If they
actually produce software that is sufficiently superior to
justify paying the IPR- protected price, then consumers
will still purchase it. In other words, the alternative
mechanisms described in this paper provide a basis for a
market test of the relative efficiency of IPR-supported
research. Those who believe that IPRs are the most
efficient mechanism for supporting software
development should favor this sort of test, which would
prove their case.
  opyrights and patents are forms of government
intervention in the market that are relics of the medieval
guild system. They are an outdated and inefficient means
to support creative and innovative work in the 21st
century. These government-granted monopolies lead
protected software to sell at prices that are far above the
free-market price. In most cases, in the absence of
copyright and patent protection, software would be
available over the Internet at zero cost.
This paper examines the ways in which copyrights and
patents (intellectual property rights, or IPRs) lead to
inefficiency and waste, and outlines alternative
mechanisms for supporting software development. It
shows that:
· Copyright and patent protection may impose
costs on consumers of between $80 and $120
billion a year, compared to a situation in which
all software was available at its competitive-
market price. The pure efficiency loss to the
economy could be in the neighborhood of $70
to $110 billion a year. These losses dwarf
estimates of the losses from other forms of
protectionism, such as tariffs or quotas on
imported goods;
· A substantial portion of the resources devoted
to software development are currently wasted
due to IPRs. This is a result of the fact that IPR
protection leads to unnecessary duplication, as
developers have substantial incentive to produce
software that simply replicates the function of
existing software. In the absence of IPR
protection, developers could better spend their
time improving existing software. IPRs also
provide incentives for software locks and
secrecy, which impede the process of software
development. It is likely that a substantial portion
of software development (possibly a majority)
is misdirected as a result of the market
distortions created by IPRs;
· IPRs also lead to large amounts of waste by
providing incentives for rent-seeking activity.
This waste includes expenditures for advertising
Executive Summary
Opening Doors and Smashing Windows l 1
CThe computer software industry is usually
considered to be at the cutting edge of U.S.
technology. At the same time, the industry relies
largely on government protectionism in the form
of copyrights and patents, relics of the feudal guild
system, to finance the development of new
software. The reliance on these antiquated
mechanisms leads to both economic inefficiency for
the economy as a whole, and poorer quality software
than would be possible in an environment in which
all software was placed in the public domain.
This paper outlines the ways in which patents and
copyrights in software lead to economic inefficiency.
It also presents alternative mechanisms that could
be used to finance the software development that
is currently supported by copyright or patent
protection. Specifically, it suggests that a mix of a
system of direct government funding for software
development and a system of individual vouchers
could be a more efficient mechanism for financing
the development of new software. All the new
software developed under both systems would be
placed in the public domain so that it could be used
at zero cost and freely modified by other
developers.1
Introduction
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1 There is an important issue about how best to
keep software developed with public funds in the
public domain in a world where private individuals
can still get IPRs. One possible mechanism is the
“copyleft” system developed by the Free Software
Movement. Under the copyleft system, the software
is copyrighted, but can still be freely reproduced, as
long as an subsequent refinements of the software
are made freely available either by being placed in
the public domain or being subject to a new
copyleft. A fuller description can be found at
http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/gpl.html2) The fact that certain types of software are
proprietary, and cannot be freely adapted to
develop new and better software, impedes the
process of software development. Research
proceeds most rapidly when all findings are
publicly available and can be freely shared by
the community of researchers. The fact that some
software is proprietary also leads to duplication
of effort, which would serve no purpose, if all
software were freely available.
3) Holders of IPRs in software devote resources to
protecting their IPRs, and also force others to
devote resources to protect their IPRs.
Specifically, software producers spend resources
designing locks, contracting services to monitor
usage of their software, hiring lobbyists and
contributing to politicians to protect their IPRs,
hiring lawyers to enforce their IPRs, and
demanding that the government and even third
parties such as Internet Service Providers and
universities take measures to protect their IPRs.
It is worth examining in somewhat more detail the nature
and size of the economic costs associated with each of
these sources of inefficiency before examining the
feasibility of alternative methods of supporting software
innovation.
One of the most basic principles in economics is that
efficiency is maximized when products sell at their
marginal cost of production. Copyright and patent
protection is explicitly designed to prevent marginal-cost
pricing by providing copyright and patent holders with a
government-enforced monopoly on the protected
product. This monopoly allows the holder of these
intellectual property rights (IPR) to charge prices that
are far above the marginal cost of production, which
would be the expected equilibrium price in a freely
competitive market.
Of course, this inefficiency may make economic sense
if the monopoly provides incentives to innovate.
However, the overriding policy question is whether
copyright and patent monopolies are the best way to
provide incentives for software development. To make
this assessment, it is necessary to determine the costs
of IPRs in software and compare them to the cost of
other mechanisms for financing software development.
There are three distinct ways in which IPRs in software
lead to economic inefficiency:
1) The gap between the IPR-protected price and
the competitive-market price (which would be
zero for most software, since it can be transferred
costlessly over the Internet) leads to a deadweight
efficiency loss. There are many consumers who
would be willing to pay at least the marginal cost
of producing another copy of the software, but
not the IPR-protected price. [This is exactly the
same argument that is made for the benefit of
free trade, although the inefficiencies that result
from most tariffs, which are in the range of 10-
20 percent, are trivial compared to the
inefficiencies that result from IPR protection.]
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The Inefficiency of Copyright and Patent Protection in the Software
IndustryDeadweight Loss: Consumers Cannot Buy Software at the
Cost of Production
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means that consumers who would have been willing to pay
more than $20, but less than $22 will not buy the shirt,
because of the tariff. This is the loss due to trade protection
that leads most economists to oppose tariffs. This loss is a
pure loss to the economy – in contrast to the extra $2 paid
by people who actually purchase the shirt. In that case, the
$2 lost by consumers is transferred to the government. The
government can then use this money for some other purpose.
However, there is no money transferred when people don’t
buy the shirt because of the tariff. The people who end up
not buying the shirt are simply made worse off because of
the tariff.
A vast body of economic research attempts to measure the
size of the loss to consumers that results from tariffs or other
taxes that create a gap between what it costs sellers to
produce a product and the price that consumers have to
pay in the market. Economists argue that the gap between
the two should be as little as possible, and ideally zero,
because this gap is a source of pure waste.
The logic here is simple. Suppose a foreign apparel
manufacturer can produce a shirt for $20, counting all costs,
including shipping and a normal profit. If there is a 10 percent
tariff then the shirt will sell in the United States for $22. This
Figure 1
Deadweight Loss From $2 Tariff on ShirtsIdentical logic applies to the IPR-protected price of
software, except in the case of software, most products
would be available at little or no cost in the absence of
IPR protection. Instead of raising the price by 10 percent,
as might be the case with a typical tariff, with software,
the only reason that there is a price at all is because of
the IPR protection. Various software applications (e.g.
spreadsheets, word processing programs, graphic
programs) that would be available for free over the
Internet, can often be sold for several hundred dollars,
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because the government grants a monopoly to the
copyright or patent holder. People who try to distribute
this software for free face fines, and possibly even
criminal charges by the government.
It is possible to use the same basic graph to show the
losses from IPR protection with software, but the
numbers would be much larger, as shown in the graph
below.
Figure 2
Deadweight Loss From Zero Marginal Cost Software, Selling at $100Opening Doors and Smashing Windows l 6
Since the gap between the cost of production of software
and the IPR-protected price is so much larger, the number
of consumers who end up not buying IPR protected
software is likely to be much larger, and the potential
loss to consumers will be much larger as well.
The logic here is straightforward. If a tariff raises the
price of a shirt by $2, then the most benefit that any
consumer could have lost because of this tariff is just
less than $2.00 – say $1.99. If the shirt was in fact worth
$2.00 more to the consumer than the competitive market
price (i.e. $22) then she would have bought the shirt.
There is only an issue if the shirt was worth more than
$20 to the consumer, but less than $22 – in which case
she would have bought it at the competitive market price,
but not at the price charged in the market with a tariff.
In the case of IPR protection of software, there are likely
to be many people who might have found the software
useful and would have even been willing to pay some
price to use it, but less than the $100 IPR-protected price
shown in the graph. In this case, the maximum loss to
consumers would be just less than the IPR protected
price (i.e. up to $100), since that is the most that
someone would have been willing to pay for the software,
who did not actually buy it.
It is possible to do some rough calculations to get a
general estimate of the potential gains to consumers,
and efficiency gains to the economy, from eliminating
IPR protection in software. Table 1 shows projections
of gains from eliminating IPR protection for software in
the market for notebook computers, the market for
desktop computers, and the market for computer and
video games. (For a fuller explanation of these
calculations see the appendix.) The projections assume
alternatively that demand is relatively unresponsive to
price (low elasticity), moderately responsive to price, and
highly responsive to price.
Middle Elasticity
Average Average Increase in Gains to Loss to Net Surplus
IPR Price free market Units Sold Consumers Producers
price billion 2005 dollars
Notebook computers $1,000 $800* 21.5 million $34.6 $1.2 $33.4
Desktop computers $800 $600* 64.4 million $48.5 $1.6 $46.9
Computer and Video games $29.50 $0 25.2 billion $13.3 $7.3 $6.0
Totals $96.4 $10.1 $86.3
High Elasticity
Average Average Increase in Gains to Loss to Net Surplus
IPR Price free market Units Sold Consumers Producers
price billion 2005 dollars
Notebook computers $1,000 $800* 37.5 million $37.6 $1.2 $36.4
Desktop computers $800 $600* 79.0 million $53.5 $1.6 $51.9
Computer and Video games $29.50 $0 8.4 trillion $24.4 $7.3 $17.1
Totals $115.5 $10.1 $105.4
Table 1
Gains to Consumers from Eliminating IPR Protection for Computer Software
Source: author’s calculations, see appendix.It is assumed that the price reductions are very large in all
cases, which leads to substantial gains to both consumers
and to the economy in the form of increased output. The
calculations in the table assume that the average sale price
of both a notebook and desktop computer would fall by
$200 (including installed software applications), if all
software were available at zero cost. They also assume
that computer purchasers would use an average of $600
of additional software (at current market prices) if all
software were available at zero cost. The calculations
assume that all video and computer games would be
available at zero cost over the Internet.
Table 2 summarizes the gains to consumers and the net
efficiency gains (after deducting losses to producers) in the
three scenarios.
Table 2
Gains to Consumers and net Gains to the Economy
From Eliminating IPRs in Software
                                            Gains to
                                                       Consumers     Net Surplus
                                                billion 2005 dollars
Low Elasticity                          $84.2 $74.1
Medium Elasticity                            $96.4 $86.3
High Elasticity                          $115.5 $105.4
Source: author’s calculations, see appendix.
The projected gains in all three cases are extremely large.
In the low elasticity case, the gain to consumers is projected
as $84.2 billion a year, an amount that is more than 50
percent larger than what the federal government spends
on roads each year. The projected gains to consumers in
the high elasticity case are $115.5 billion, more than twice
the annual federal transportation budget. The projected gains
to the economy are similarly large. The net surplus in the
low elasticity case is $74.1 billion a year, an amount that
exceeds the GDP of Guatemala. The net surplus in the high
elasticity case is more than $100 billion a year, an amount
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that is equal to approximately 0.8 percent of U.S. GDP.
Very few economic policies yield these sorts of potential
efficiency gains.
There are two important points to note on these calculations,
in addition to the fact that they are extremely crude
projections. First, they are based on worldwide estimates
of the computer market. Much of these projected gains
would accrue to people outside of the United States. While
there is nothing wrong with this, presumably it would be
desirable to devise a method to share the cost of developing
software, at least among middle income and wealthy
countries, who can afford to pay part of this burden. Devising
a system to share the costs of an alternative system for
financing software development internationally would require
some coordination. However, would likely be far simpler
and easier to enforce than the complex system currently in
place to standardize and enforce IPRs internationally.
The second point is that these calculations only assume gains
associated with the purchase of new computers. If software
were freely available over the web, tens of millions of current
owners of computers would take advantage of the
opportunity to download better software at zero cost. This
would lead to a large one-time gain (probably several times
larger than the annual gain assumed in these calculations)
that is not captured in these projections. This one-time gain
in consumer surplus could easily run into the hundreds of
billions of dollars, if several hundred million computer owners
download software worth an average of several hundred
dollars per computer.IPR Protection – Impeding Innovation and Promoting Duplication
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arrangement with an IPR holder. In many cases, software
developers may simply choose to direct their energies
elsewhere.
There can also be instances where ambiguity about the
nature of a software copyright or patent, by itself, inhibits
progress. For example, if Microsoft establishes a
reputation for aggressively defending its IPRs, it may
discourage software developers from pursuing lines of
research that are not actually infringing on Microsoft’s
IPRs, but which may still be close enough to prompt
lawsuits. The asymmetry of resources between Microsoft
and a small software developer is sufficiently large that
many developers may simply decide to abandon a path
of research altogether rather than get into a long legal
battle over IPRs.
The existence of IPR protection in software also provides
incentives for wasteful duplication. If there is an
application subject to IPR protection that proves to be
popular (e.g. a word-processing program or spreadsheet
program), there is a powerful incentive for other
developers to produce a competitive program that does
not infringe on the copyright or patent. While there is
nothing wrong with giving consumers a choice of
programs, in many cases the sole motivation may be that
the initial program was subject to IPR protection. In other
words, if a popular spreadsheet program were available
at zero cost over the web to anyone who wanted to use
it, there would be little incentive for someone to attempt
to develop an alternative, even if the alternative would
be subject to IPR protection. If the original program
lacked important features, the most efficient action for
a developer to do would be to modify the existing
program to incorporate the new feature, rather than
create a near-duplicate of the original program —all the
while being careful not to infringe on the original
developer’s IPRs— simply to add an additional feature.
However, if the original program is subject to IPR
protection, then an alternative can potentially take away
The second major type of inefficiency associated with
IPR protections in software are the ways in which IPR
protection impedes the development of new software
and leads to wasteful duplication. The first point is easy
to describe, although difficult to quantify. If we imagine
the scientific process as being a collective exercise in
which everyone builds on each other’s progress, and
learns from mistakes, then the process will obviously
advance most quickly in an environment in which
information flows most freely. If software developers
have ready access to the work of other developers, and
can freely integrate this work into their own projects,
then the development process will proceed much more
quickly than if developers are forced to work in isolation
or cannot borrow from the discoveries of others.
IPR protection in software leads to both sorts of
problems. Companies seeking to profit from software
copyrights or patents will not make information on their
progress publicly available until they actually file for IPR
protection. This is simply the nature of the incentives
provided by the IPR system. If a company allowed
information to get out before it had filed for IPR
protection, then a competitor could use this information
to get a copyright or patent of their own. Even when a
company does file for IPR protection, it will typically
only disclose the information needed to gain protection
– it will still keep much of its work secret. Software
producers are likely to continue to maintain as much
secrecy as possible around their process of software
development, both to prevent aiding competitors and to
preserve an edge in developing future products.
Of course, even when a product is available, competitors
cannot freely build on it if the product is subject to IPR
protection,. In other words, a software designer does not
have the option to develop an extension of an IPR-
protected piece of software, which might make it more
useful, without the permission of the IPR holder. This
could prevent many useful adaptations of software, since
it can be costly and time consuming to negotiate ana substantial portion of the monopoly profits earned by
the first program.
This sort of competition is actually desirable in a world
where programs sell for high prices due to IPR protection,
since competition will lead to lower prices for consumers.
However, in a world without IPR protection, there would
be little reason to design a second program that essentially
just replicates the tasks already performed by an existing
program. In most cases, the time of software designers
could be much more productively spent improving the
original program, or on other projects.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to estimate the losses due
to secrecy in development or unnecessary duplication.
In the pharmaceutical industry, approximately two thirds
of research spending by the industry goes to develop
duplicative rather than breakthrough drugs.2 While there
is some value associated with such copycat drugs (some
patients may have bad reactions to one drug, but not to
the copycat drug) this research is almost certainly less
valuable than research on a breakthrough drug. It is
probably reasonable to assume that somewhere in the
neighborhood of half of the patent supported drug
research is wasted on such duplicative research.
There is no obvious basis for projecting the extent to
which software development would be advanced if all
research was public and freely available to other
developers. While the availability of more information
would surely lead to better software that is developed
more quickly, it is really only possible to guess at the
extent of the gains from increased openness.
One further complication in projecting the gains in this
respect from eliminating IPR protection is that it is not
even clear how much software development currently
depends on IPRs. While the Commerce Department
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provides estimates of spending on software
(approximately $190 billion in the United States in 2005),
much of this spending is for custom software programs
that are tailored for the needs of a specific user (such as
customer-service software for a commercial bank, rental-
car agency, or online retail store). While the software
developers may obtain IPRs for the software they install,
most of the fees involved are for the design and
installation of a firm-specific system. The lack of IPR
protection would probably have little impact on the price
of these systems or the ability of these software
developers to charge for their work.
A crude way of projecting the amount of software
development that depends on IPR protection is to use
Microsoft’s reported expenditures as a basis of
calculation. In its quarterly statement for the second half
of 2004, Microsoft reported that it spent $3.0 billion on
research and development in the second half of 2004.3
Assuming that this it spent roughly the same amount in
the first half, this would mean that Microsoft spent a
total of $6 billion on software development in 2004. If
this sum is doubled to include the spending of other
software developers, then it implies that the industry
spent $12 billion of research supported by IPR protection
in 2004.
Using this number as a starting point, it is possible to
project the amount of wasted expenditures in software
development due to IPR protection. Table 3 shows
projections for low, middle, and high waste scenarios,
making alternative assumptions about the waste due to
unnecessary duplication and secrecy. In the case of
unnecessary duplication, the low, middle, and high waste
scenarios assume alternatively that 20 percent, 40
percent, and 60 percent of expenditures are devoted to
duplicative activity that would not be carried through in
the absence of IPR protection. The losses due to secrecy
are assumed to be alternatively 10 percent, 20 percent,
and 30 percent.
3 Microsoft’s annual statement from the second half of 2004 can be
found at [http://www.microsoft.com/msft/earnings/FY05/
earn_rel_q2_05.mspx].
2 This estimate is derived from the Food and Drug Administration’s
classification of new drugs and the pharmaceutical industry’s estimate
of the cost of developing duplicative, as opposed to breakthrough
drugs, see “Financing Drug Research: What Are the Issues?"Opening Doors and Smashing Windows l 10
Table 3
Wasteful Software Development Expenditures Due to IPR
Protection
                     Waste Due to                 Waste Due Total Waste
Unnecessary                 to Secrecy               Due to IPR
Duplication                                                   Protection
                                             billion 2005 dollars
Low Waste $2.4                        $1.2         $3.4
Middle Waste $4.8                        $2.4         $6.2
High Waste $7.2                        $3.6         $8.6
Source: author’s calculations, see text.
Clearly the projections in table 3 are little more than
guesses. More research would be needed to generate an
accurate estimate of the amount of software that is
currently supported by IPR protection. It should also be
possible to find some basis for providing better estimates
of the amount of development that is wasted on
unnecessary duplicative activity as a result of IPR
protection. Assessing the relative rate at which software
development might proceed in an environment of free
and open software compared with IPR-protected
software would almost certainly require guesswork in
any case, because we will never see the two systems
developing independently side by side. Obviously, there
is a loss due to secrecy, but there is no obvious way of
determining whether the numbers used in this table
capture the range of plausible estimates.
With these extremely important qualifications, the
assumptions used in constructing the table lead to
scenarios in which between 28 percent and 72 percent
of current software development expenditures are wasted
due to the distortions created by IPR protection. The
implication of such projections, if their basis turns out
to be plausible, is that a system of publicly financed
system of free and open software would require far less
spending on software development to accomplish the
same results. Alternatively, the same level of publicly
provided spending could lead to far more impressive
accomplishments, if free and open software were the
standard.Rent Seeking Activities of IPR Holders
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IPR protection. At the most basic level, this involves
designing digital locks, or other features of the software,
that make it difficult to copy. Some portion of the
resources devoted to software development must be
employed to making the software more difficult to
duplicate, instead of making it better for the consumer.
Obviously, from the standpoint of the economy, such
expenditures are a complete waste.
In addition to the resources devoted to designing software
that is more difficult to duplicate, software producers
also must make a wide variety of expenditures to ensure
that their IPRs are respected. These expenditures includes
efforts to monitor the distribution of their software over
the web, legal fees associated with enforcing IPRs, and
contributions to political campaigns and public relations
efforts needed to sustain and extend IPR protection.
Beyond the expenses incurred by producers, there are
also costs associated with enforcing IPR borne by other
actors in the economy. These costs include paying for
the law enforcement officials and the court personal
required to enforce IPRs, enforcement efforts imposed
on third parties such as Internet Service Providers and
universities, and also restrictions on the developments
of technologies that could facilitate the violation of
IPRs.
This last category of costs is likely the most important.
The software industry (along with the entertainment
industry) has persuaded Congress to pass legislation that
restricts the production of hardware or software that
facilitates infringement on IPRs. 6 While the exact
meaning of these restrictions has not yet been clarified
by the courts, clearly they have the effect of slowing
technological progress. If a hardware or software producer
must worry that the courts will prohibit them from selling
the product that they hope to develop, then there will be
less incentive to pursue the development of technology
Another major source of waste associated with IPR
protection in software is the rent- seeking activities that
it causes. The large gap between the price and marginal
cost of the product gives producers far more incentive
to advertise and market their products than would be
the case if they were selling at their competitive-market
price. While the additional sales that result from such
marketing may be highly profitable for the producers,
the expenses from sales efforts are largely a waste from
the standpoint of the economy as a whole.4
No reliable data exist on the amount of money devoted
to marketing relative to the amount spent on software
development, but it is likely that the ratio is quite high.
In the pharmaceutical industry, where patent protection
leads to mark-ups that average 300-400 percent above
the free market price, nearly twice as many people are
employed in marketing than in research.5 The relative
size of the monopoly profits due to IPR protection in
the software industry is even larger. Microsoft reported
spending roughly 30 percent more on marketing than it
did on research and development in the second half of
2004 (Microsoft 2005). If this pattern is repeated
throughout the industry, then the calculations used in
the last section would imply that approximately $15
billion a year is spent by the software industry on
advertising and marketing.
While excess spending on advertising and marketing is
probably the largest single rent-seeking cost associated
with IPR protection, it is just one of many. A second
potentially costly expense involves security measures that
are necessary simply because the software is subject to
4 Advertising and marketing can provide information about products,
which is economically beneficial. However, if this information is
misleading, and prompts consumers to opt for software that is less
well suited for their purposes, the sales effort contributes negatively
to the economy. Even if no resources were required for the sales




6 This discussion refers to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act,
which was signed into law by President Clinton in 1998.designed to facilitate quick and accurate reproduction
of digital material.
The set of costs implied by these efforts to secure
economic rents are difficult to quantify. Software
developers spend tens of millions of dollars on lobbying
and campaign contributions every year. 7 They almost
certainly spend an even larger amount on lawyers engaged
in work intended to either protect their own IPRs or to
defend the company against the charge of having
infringed on the IPRs of others.
There are no good measures of the cost that IPR holders
(more often in the entertainment sector than software)
have imposed on third parties by requiring monitoring
or other efforts to discourage IPR infringement. In some
cases, that largest expense may be simply be the time
involved. For example, if a college requires that 5,000
incoming students sit through a one-hour lecture on
respecting IPRs, the implicit cost would be $50,000, if
an hour of these students’ time is worth an average of
$10.
While it is virtually certain that search and copying
software and hardware would be more advanced if the
development of these technologies had not been
impaired by  efforts to enforce IPRs, there is no obvious
way to measure the extent to which development of
these technologies have been impeded. It is reasonable
to assume that we would see substantially more progress
in these areas if developers did not have to worry about
legal actions from holders of IPRs.
In sum, there are clearly substantial costs associated with
the rent-seeking of IPR holders in software. These costs
are extremely difficult to measure, but nonetheless are
likely to be substantial.
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7 The Center for Responsive Politics reports that Microsoft along
spent more than $6 million on lobbying in 2004 (www.crp.org).21st Century Alternatives to Patents and Copyrights
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If there were no alternative mechanisms to finance
software development, then there would be no choice
but to live with all the costs that software-related IPRs
impose on the economy. Fortunately, there are
alternatives and there are good reasons to believe that
these alternatives would be far more efficient than the
existing system, saving consumers billions of dollars,
leading to more jobs and economic growth, and the
production of better software. The two alternative
mechanisms discussed in this section are a system of
direct government support, modeled after a proposal
for an alternative to patent financing for prescription
drug research, and a system of individual vouchers,
which is an extension of an alternative mechanism to
copyright for financing creative and artistic work.
The development of software is probably best
supported by a mix of the two systems. Some types of
software bear features that are probably more similar
to pharmaceuticals, while other types of software have
more in common with music, movies, and other creative
work that are typically supported by copyright at present.
Specifically, standardized software that is likely to be
used by tens or hundreds of millions of people, such
as computer operating systems, or word processing and
spreadsheet applications, and provide a basis for many
other spin-off applications, is similar to
pharmaceuticals in that the assessment of quality can
probably best be determined by experts in the area.
While an individual consumer can assess the system
that she finds most useful, she will not typically be able
to assess the software for technical features, likes its
ability to be adapted for additional applications or its
resistance to viruses. For this reason, the allocation for
funds to develop these types of software is probably
best left to people who are experts in software
development.
On the other hand, the quality of more narrowly
tailored applications, such as video games, specialized
graphic programs, or search programs is probably best
assessed directly by the consumer. For these types of
software, it would make sense to leave the allocation of
development funds in the hands of consumers. Of course,
there is no reason to draw a clear line between the two
types of software. There would no harm done, if some of
the funding intended for the latter type of software ended
up promoting the development of spreadsheet
applications, or some of the funding intended for the former
type of software ended up being used to develop a graphic
design package. The point of having two separate
mechanisms is to ensure that no important areas of
software development are neglected; no serious harm
results if there are some areas of overlap between the two
sources of funding.
IPR Alternative I: The Software Development Corps
As is the case with prescription drugs, the development
of system software and widely used and standardized
applications is probably best carried through by a central
funding mechanism controlled by experts in the field.10
There are several key principles that should be applied in
setting up such a system. First is the open source/free
software principle. The software developed through this
system is being paid for with the public’s tax dollars, this
means that it belongs to the public. All software produced
through this system should be fully available to the public
to use and alter as they see fit (possibly subject to
“copyleft” restrictions – anyone is free to use the software
directly or as basis for future modifications, as long as
they don’t attempt to restrict its future use).
To enforce this  principle of free software, it would
probably be necessary to require that anyone receiving
funding through this system be ineligible for IPR protection
for any of their work for a substantial period of time (e.g.
10 This model is based on a proposal for financing prescription drugs,
which was part of a bill recently introduced in Congress (The Free
Market Drug Act of 2004). A description of this mechanism can be
found in “Financing Prescription Drug Research: What Are the
Options?”Opening Doors and Smashing Windows l 14
5 years). This would prevent developers from gaming
the system by being paid to develop software, but then
gaining IPR protection for their best ideas so that they
could personally profit from them. The great feature
of this system is that it would be largely self-enforcing.
A copyright or patent granted to a person who received
support through the Software Development Corps is
simply invalid. Anyone can freely ignore their IPRs. The
sanction to the person who has illegally claimed an IPR
in such situations is simply that the courts will not
enforce their patents.
The second principle that it would be important to
preserve is competition. This can be accomplished by
having the public funding for software development
divided among several competing public corporations.
For example, if the public funding for this mechanism
of software development is $2 billion a year, then this
money can be divided among ten firms that would each
receive $200 million a year to support software
development. These firms would then be free to use
this money to finance the software research they deemed
most promising, subject to the legal framework
described above. The public corporations could either
look to hire developers directly or subcontract out with
firms or research institutions, or some mix of the two
mechanisms. (The National Institutes of Health may
provide a good model here. Less than one-fifth of its
spending supports research that it directly undertakes,
the rest is contracted out with private institutions and
individuals.)
At regular intervals (e.g. 7 years), the work of the
software development companies would be assessed
by an independent commission of experts and users.
The worst two would be shutdown, with two new ones
being created to replace them. This should ensure that
the companies feel pressure to use their funds effectively
and that failed bureaucracies are not perpetuated
indefinitely.
In addition, it would also be desirable to have a separate
pool of money in this system (e.g. $100 million a year),
which could be used as prize money to reward outstanding
breakthroughs in software development. This should ensure
that software developers have substantial monetary
incentives. Such a prize fund could allow developers who
do extraordinary work to get a bonus of hundreds of
thousands of dollars, or even millions of dollars, if their
work makes an exceptional contribution to the field.
Annual funding at the level of $2 billion a year ($2.1 billion
including the prize money) would be sufficient to hire
20,000 programmers a year, assuming base salaries of
$80,000 a year and 25 percent overhead.11 This sum would
likely be sufficient to replace the bulk of the software
development currently supported by the IPR system. Such
a commitment of funding would be relatively small for
the federal government, being equal to approximately 0.08
percent of annual spending. Furthermore, it is likely to
have most, if not all, of these expenditures reimbursed in
the form of lower-priced computers and software. If
governments at all levels (federal, state and local) buy 5
million computers a year, and the average savings on new
computers and software came to $500 per computer, then
the savings to the government would be $2.5 billion a year,
considerably more than the sum committed by the federal
government to support software development. (Of course,
much of this savings would accrue to state and local
governments.)
In this case, the benefits to the rest of the economy, in the
form of much lower cost computers and software would
be a free lunch – effectively the equivalent of a tax cut of
between $80-$120 billion a year, with no offsetting cuts
in government services. This would both lead to large
immediate gains to consumers and to a substantial stimulus
to the economy. The money that consumers save on buying
11 The Bureau of Labor Statistics Occupational Employment
Statistics Survey estimated the average annual wage of a computer
programmer in 2004 at approximately $80,000 [http://bls.gov/
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computers and software can instead be diverted to other
areas of consumption or may be used as savings to
finance new investment.
The Artistic Freedom Voucher – Leaving Software
Support to the Individual
The second mechanism that could be used to support
software development is the Artistic Freedom Voucher
(AFV), a system of individual vouchers.12 Under this
system, every adult would be provided with a certain
amount of money (e.g. $100 dollars) which they could
use to support any person they like who is engaged in
creative or artistic work. Such work would include writing
and performing music, writing or performing in movies,
writing books, newspapers or designing software. The
money could also be paid to intermediaries who support
creative or artistic work (for example, an intermediary
may specialize in supporting the writing of mysteries or
the production of a certain type of video game).
In order to be eligible to receive funding through the
AFV system, a person or intermediary would have to
register with the government in the same way that a non-
profit organization or a church must register with the
government in order to obtain non-profit status. In such
cases, the registration amounts to informing the
government of what sort of creative/artistic work the
individual does or the organization supports. The
government does not assess the merit of the work, its
only responsibility is to ensure that fraud is not taking
place, in the same way that it verifies that religious
organizations are in fact engaged in religious activity and
not running a business or a tax scam.
It may be desirable to have a separate software
development voucher, apart from a more general artistic
freedom voucher, to ensure that a certain portion of this
funding go to software development. The disadvantage
of having this distinction is that it would make the system
more complicated. However, it would be a possible
modification if it turned out that individuals were
neglecting software developers in their allocation of funds
from an artistic freedom voucher.
As with the Software Development Corps, individuals who
receive funding through the AFV system (either directly
or through an intermediary) are prohibited from gaining
IPR protection for their work for a substantial period of
time after receiving this support. All the work must be
placed in the public domain where it is freely available.
12 This mechanism extends a proposal for supporting creative and
artistic work described in “The Artistic Freedom Voucher: Internet
Age Alternative to Copyrights”It is important to note that the IPR system can in principle
exist side by side in competition with these alternative
mechanisms for supporting software development. There
is no reason that software developers, like Microsoft, could
not continue to produce IPR-protected software and try
to sell it in the market. If they actually produce software
that is sufficiently superior to justify paying the IPR-
protected price, then consumers will still purchase it. These
alternatives simply provide a basis for a market test of the
two systems.
In this context, it is important to understand that this
competition is between two forms of government subsidies,
not between a government-funded system and a market-
based system. In one system, the government pays for the
development of software upfront either through the Software
Development Corps or the AFV system. In the IPR system,
the government gives software developers a state-imposed
monopoly, where the government criminalizes competition
for a period of time.
In a free-market system, software developers would simply
be left on their own – producing their software and selling
it as best they could. If another software developer had the
ability to reproduce and sell the software, then the original
developer would have no mechanism to prevent such sales.
IPR protection is one way that the government interferes in
the free market, in this case, in order to provide incentives
to software developers. The appropriate question is whether
IPRs are the best mechanism.
The Competition Between IPR's and Alternative Mechanisms
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development of software brings with a large cost in terms
of economic inefficiency. The most obvious source of
inefficiency is the enormous mark-up over the free-
market prices that results from the government
enforcement of monopolies in the sale of computer
software. For the most part, software that currently
commands substantial prices as a result of IPR
protection would be available at zero cost over the
Internet, in the absence of such protection.
However, IPR protection also distorts the process of
software development itself. It encourages unnecessary
duplication, as software developers devote time and
resources to duplicating software that is protected by
IPRs in order to gain a portion of the monopoly rents.
In the absence of IPR protection, effort would generally
be better directed towards improving existing software.
Secrecy and restrictions on the use of IPR-protected
software impede the process of software development
as well.
IPR protection also leads to large expenditures by IPR
holders to protect their rents. These expenditures include
advertising and marketing, legal fees, and lobbying and
campaign contributions. All ways in which IPR holders
seek to maximize their monopoly rents. IPR holders also
impose costs on others, such as Internet Service
Providers and universities, by requiring them to take
steps to enforce IPRs. In addition, IPRs have managed
to obstruct the development of software and hardware
that facilitates searches and reproduction of digital
material.
The paper proposes two alternative mechanisms for
funding software development, both of which can co-
exist in competition with the IPR system. One would
provide approximately $2 billion a year of government
funding through a set of competing software
development companies. In this case, all the software
would be made freely available to be reproduced or
altered, subject to copyleft principles. The second
mechanism would allow all adults a certain sum of
money (e.g. $100) which could be used to finance any
creative or artistic venture of their choice, including the
development of software or computer games. Any work
supported through this system would also be
immediately placed in the public domain.
It is quite likely that the government could fully recoup
the money it paid for software development through
lower prices on the computers and software it purchases.
In this case, the lower computer and software prices
seen by the general public would have the same effect
as a tax break in the neighborhood of $80-$120 billion
a year, with no offsetting cut in public services. Money
that had been spent paying for computers and software
would instead be devoted to either items, providing a
substantial boost to the economy and leading to millions
of new jobs.
Conclusion
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for desktop computers were 80 million units in 2004.
They assume that sales of laptops were 60 million. The
average prices are assumed to be $800 and $1,000,
respectively. It is assumed that without IPR protection,
the average price of the computers purchased would
fall by $200, and that the value of the additional
software included with an average computer be $600 at
current prices, with a value to consumers equal to $300.
(In other words, it is assumed that the decline in the
price of computers is equivalent to an average of $500
per computer.) It is assumed that the average price of a
computer or video game is $29.50, based on data from
the industry.13 The low, medium, and high elasticity
scenarios assume a constant elasticity of substitution
utility function with elasticities of 0.2, 0.45, and 0.7,
respectively. The estimates of current sales volumes are
loosely derived from a recent article in the business press
which put worldwide sales of notebook computers at
60 million units a year. 14 It is assumed that desktop sales
are somewhat larger, at 100 million units a year. The
estimate of the volume of computer and video games
sales at 250 million units a year at an average price of
$29.50 is taken from Essential Facts About the Computer
and Video Game Industry, 2005, Entertainment Software
Association.
[www.theesa.com/files/2005essentialfacts.pdf]. The
calculations in Table 2 present sums from Table 1.
Appendix
13 http://www.theesa.com/files/2005essential facts.pdf
14 These calculations assume 2005 world sales of notebook computers
are 60 million, at an average price of $1000 per computer. This is
derived loosely from recent public sales data (“
Taiwan took 81.3% share of global notebook PC sales in Q2" [http:/
/english.www.gov.tw/index.jsp?id=12&recid=109038&viewdate=0
]). The calculations assume that the 2005 sales volume of desktop
computers is 80 million at an average price of $800.
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